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Researchers in the social sciences as well as other disciplines rely on statistical 
models to develop and test theories. The standard approach applies multivariate 
analysis—usually linear regression—and statistical hypothesis testing to 
observational data. The researcher may have several independent variables in mind 
as candidate predictors of the dependent variable; those reaching statistical 
significance compose the final model. In other situations, a theory is assumed to be 
correct and regression analysis is used to estimate parameters. Though experiments 
with random assignment of subjects are recognized as the “gold standard” for 
research, these are rarely possible in political science. Instead we rely on statistical 
controls to overcome problems inherent in using nonexperimental data.  
 
This paper suggests that our confidence in using statistical methods to construct 
theories is misplaced and that theory testing is more productive when we combine 
definitive theory-generated predictions with statistical methods. I begin with a review 
of problems in the current approach to statistical analysis, then give several 
examples of how prediction can be improved.  
 
Failures in Theory Testing with Observational Data 
Research in political science is rarely subject to the degree of scrutiny that would 
expose the weakness in its statistical underpinnings. But examples from medical 
research show the seriousness of problems inherent in multivariate regression 
analysis typical of political science.  
 
For some years physicians prescribed hormone replacement therapy for 
postmenopausal women in the belief that it would reduce their risk of heart attacks. 
Millions of women took their doctor’s advice and, I would guess, billions of dollars 
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were spent on this therapy. This protocol was based on observational research 
extending back many years, and there was sound theory to back it up. After 
menopause, a woman’s risk of heart attack increases, just at the time her estrogen 
levels decrease. Further, treatment with estrogen is known to increase good 
cholesterol and decrease bad cholesterol, which ought to reduce the risk of a heart 
attack. This theory and the use of hormone replacements were backed up by positive 
findings in over 30 statistically controlled observational studies. But no randomized 
experiment on this therapy had been done before the therapy was widely adopted. It 
was recognized that women who sought replacement theory might be healthier or 
better educated than women generally are, lowering their risks of heart disease. But 
researchers tried their best to control these possibilities statistically.  
 
This entire therapy was proved unfounded by Manson et al (2003) when results from 
several large experiments came in. The Women’s Health Initiative, a randomized 
experiment involving over 16,000 postmenopausal women, found that this therapy 
actually increased the risks of coronary heart disease. The observational studies had 
mistakenly validated a wrong theory with the outcome that many women may have 
developed heart problems as a result of treatment, and a tremendous amount of 
money was wasted on ineffective treatments.  
 
This example should be a great caution to political scientists, as we are working with 
less well developed theories and with less rigorous testing of our theories than the 
medical community. This is not an isolated example of a failure of observational 
studies in the medical area. Let’s look at another case.  
 
Over the past few decades we have gotten a lot of advice on what we should eat or 
not eat because of its supposed health benefits or risks. Almost all of this has been 
based on statistical analysis of nonexperimental data, and much of it has proved 
wrong when subjected to experimental research. For about 10 years, it was widely 
believed that Vitamin E might protect us against cancer or heart disease by mopping 
up destructive free radicals circulating in our bodies. In 1993 the New England 
Journal of Medicine reported two observational studies, statistically controlled, that 
showed a decline in heart disease among people who took extra amounts of Vitamin 
E. One of these studies (Rimm, et al. 1993) involved almost 40,000 men who were 
observed over a period of four years—a study that by its size and duration would put 
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it among the best ever done if it had been done in political science. Again, however, 
recent experimental evidence has contradicted the efficacy of Vitamin E. A meta-
analysis of experimental studies with a total of 80,000 subjects published in 2003 by 
Vivekananthan et al. found no benefit for Vitamin E in heart disease. So we have 
another example of failure in very well done nonexperimental studies with good 
statistical control and solid theory.  
 
The failure in the early vitamin E research and similar nutritional studies is likely a 
result of model uncertainty, which can bias results (Chatfield 1995). Statistical 
testing is based on the assumption that the model in known. Model uncertainty 
arises when the model is not specified but based on the predictors that best fit the 
data. For example, one may include ten independent variables as candidate 
predictors and then use only the four that are statistically significant for the final 
model. Model uncertainty also comes in when one is coding variables into categories, 
as well as with nonlinearities and interaction among variables. The model produced 
may overly depend on extreme values in the sample, which biases the result toward 
lower p values and smaller standard errors. Because the final model depends on 
randomness in the sample, the model selection process is itself a random data-
dependent process.  
 
Much of contemporary statistical research is a ‘junkyard of unsubstantiated 
confidence’ based on false positive results (Longford 2005: 471). The rate of failure 
has been estimated by Ioannidis (2005) in a review of 49 highly cited medical 
research articles from 1990 to 2003—each cited over 1,000 times. Among the 45 
original articles that claimed to find effective interventions, 7 (16%) were 
contradicted by later research. This still underestimates the false positive rate for 
nonrandomized studies, however; 5 of 6 were contradicted by later research. Among 
randomized studies 9 of 39 were contradicted.  
 
One might conclude from these examples that we should abandon nonexperimental 
studies. I don’t believe this is necessary, though I am an advocate of political 
scientists doing more experiments and looking for natural experiments. The natural 
sciences have succeeded in part by developing theories that make definitive 
predictions—predictions that would almost certainly not be found if the underlying 
theory were false.  
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Would better statistical methods solve the problem? Statisticians are working on the 
model uncertainty problem, but a solution seems distant. Meanwhile, social scientists 
and econometricians have devoted a tremendous amount of work over the past 
several decades to the improvement of statistical methods. It seems fair to consider 
whether this effort has produced better social theories. So let’s review some critiques 
that economists have made of research in their field. This is pertinent in that political 
scientists seem to draw more and more on econometrics to solve problems with 
multivariate analyses.  
 
Econometrics and Economic Theory 
For the past half century or more, from the time of the Cowles Commission, 
economists have worked diligently to create an economic science combining theory, 
measurement, and statistical analysis. The field of econometrics is impressive 
testimony of this. In the 1990s, however, a number of economists began to express 
their doubts about the success of this endeavor.  
 
Economists have the same research standards as political scientists. To Lawrence 
Summers (1991: 129) “the best empirical work in macroeconomics formally tests 
substantive hypotheses rigorously derived from economic theory [and] sophisticated 
statistical techniques can play an important role in sorting out causation in systems 
with many independent variables.” But his conclusion from reviewing progress in 
economic science is that this method almost always fails to find causal relationships 
that are not already obvious from the start. In his view, econometrics has had a 
negligible impact on the development of an economic science. Replication is mostly 
absent and rarely important, and methodological advances are confused with 
substantive progress. As to statistical testing he comments (p. 135) that “without 
some idea of the power of statistical tests against interesting alternative hypotheses 
. . . statistical tests are uninformative.” He asserts that the best empirical evidence 
needs the least complicated statistical support and tells its story without much 
concern for the specific method of analysis.  
 
Theory testing in economics went well up to the 1970s. Models derived from theory 
were mainly linear or had simple nonlinear forms. They were easily tested with 
regression analysis to identify relevant variables that should be included—albeit a 
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very limited expectation for testing a theory. This situation changed in the 1970s, 
however, as empirical weaknesses in the old models became more apparent and the 
methods were not suited to newer dynamic models (Pesaran and Smith 1995; 
Heckman 2000.) Pesaran and Smith cite (p. 76) a yet more fundamental problem: 
“there is no agreed on method of judging whether the conditional predictions match 
the data and thus whether the evidence rejects the theory.” If the data do not fit the 
theory, one cannot be sure if one should reject the theory, the methods used, or 
auxiliary assumptions made to test the theory. In their view, these conditions now 
make theory testing almost impossible.  
 
The inability to test theories also calls into question the practicality of Popper’s idea 
of theory falsification as the path to scientific progress. Dharmapala and McAleer 
(1996) contend that often the truth of an economic theory is assumed. The goal of 
empirical testing, as it often happens in everyday research, is the estimation of 
unknown parameters in a model, not a test of the theory itself. If there is more than 
one theory for a set of phenomena or more than one model can be derived from a 
theory, econometrics is not much help. If the criteria for falsification are too strong, 
one may reject all theories; if the criteria are relaxed, however, then one cannot 
reject the false theory with certainty. From their analysis one can interpret that the 
falsification ideal is subject to an arbitrariness that makes it impractical as a guide 
for scientific progress.  
 
These commentaries on the state of economics resonate with the problems political 
scientists face. So how do we find our way out of the forest? The methods of physics 
are one source of advice. I suggest that we also examine how people construct 
theories in everyday life. Psychologists have recently come to a good understanding 
of the cognitive processes in our naïve construction of theories about the world 
around us. The give us an exemplar to consider when setting a standard for what 
makes for good testing of a theory.  
 
Psychology of Theory Construction 
To understand how the world works, humans develop and test theories as a normal 
part of life. Our ability to do this is innate and follows a process that psychological 
research is beginning to reveal (Ahn et al. 1995; Cheng 1997; Buehner, Cheng and 
Clifford 2003). Earlier, psychologists believed that people used information about 
 6 
covariation to identify the causes of events. Supposedly, people were like naïve 
social scientists; they observed what factors were correlated with an event and then 
constructed a theory about cause and effect. But new research refutes this idea. 
Instead, people have in mind causal models and seek information that might confirm 
or reject them (Ahn et al. 1995).  
 
If a person were using a covariation model to explain an event, for example, they 
would be looking for factors that are either present or absent when the event occurs. 
By contrast, in assessing a causal model a person is trying to elaborate a mechanism 
that might have produced the event, seeking out information for or against a range 
of possible theories. Research confirms that people use this cognitive approach.  
 
Further, people evaluate whether a mechanism causes an event by thinking about 
the difference in probability between getting the event when the prospective cause is 
present less the probability of getting the event when the factor is absent. New 
research also shows, however, that this model must be weighted inversely by a 
factor that attenuates the expectation of a cause when alternative causes are more 
often associated with the event in question (Buehner, Cheng and Clifford 2003).  
 
If we apply this psychological model to how we test theories in social science, it is 
possible that our audience will find social theories more convincing and useful. To do 
this, one should try to explain a phenomenon by starting with one or more specific 
theories that would explain it; then look for a situation or test for a specifically 
predicted result that has a high probability of being associated with the prospective 
theory but otherwise is very unlikely to be observed.  
 
By the psychological standard, one can see problems with postdictive regression 
analyses. Regression models often are not derived from a strong or specific 
theoretical base but are used to explore for possible explanatory variables. 
Alternative regression models often are available for the same phenomena, and the 
models produced by a regression analysis are often consistent with multiple theories 
of the same or different phenomena. In everyday life, people do not look to 




Examples of Predictive Theory Testing 
The physical and biological sciences are good sources for ideas on what types of 
theoretically derived predictions lead to better theory testing. Here are several 
examples: 
฀ Prediction of a constant or invariant (like the speed of light or a freezing 
point) 
฀ Prediction of a specific number (typical of weather forecasting) 
฀ Prediction of a symmetry, often derived from a mathematical model 
฀ Prediction of a topological fixed point 
฀ Prediction of a limit or constraint, or dynamic limit cycle 
฀ Prediction of a specific or unusual dynamic behavior pattern  
฀ Prediction of a specific spatial (geographic) pattern 
฀ Prediction of an unusual statistical distribution 
฀ Prediction that data will have a “signature” –- a unique mathematical shape 
(as used for detecting heart arrhythmias, nuclear tests, tsunamis, or 
submarines) 
 
Sometimes a predicted result is better tested or more evident when the data are 
transformed and displayed in a different coordinate system. I’ll give a few examples 
below. 
 
Unusual statistical distributions are getting more attention for the qualitative 
prediction or rare or extreme events, such as nuclear accidents, financial crises and 
stock market crashes, natural disasters, ecological changes, and violence or wars 
(Sornette 2002; Coles 2001; Malinetskii and Kurdyumov 2001; Clauset and Young 
2005). Extreme events follow a power law type of statistical distribution that makes 
them more likely to occur than one would expect from a normal distribution. To 
estimate the underlying distribution one samples the tail of the distribution rather 
than, for example, the central tendency or variation. Obviously these are important 
phenomena for policy makers to understand, whether they relate directly to political 
events or affect governments through the scale of disaster.  
 
We can add a few examples to this list from game theory, such as predictions that 
people will tend to make a certain decision given the rules and payoffs of a game 
(Smith 2003); or from psychology, that people usually respond in specific ways to 
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information, their surroundings, or what other people are doing (Plous 1993). Much 
work needs to be done, however, to understand how these individual decision 
processes play out in a large society. 
 
Predictions about voting behavior using the entropy measure  
To demonstrate my argument I would like to give several examples of both 
qualitative and quantitative theory testing using specific predictions. I am drawing 
these examples from my own research over many years and refer the reader to the 
original publications to get the full basis for the predictions. I only sketch some of 
the theory and analysis because my aim is to show a variety of approaches while 
limiting the substantive detail presented on each.  
 
The examples I use are all from voting behavior and use the same quantitative 
measure, the Shannon entropy measure of information theory. The entropy measure 
is widely used in many disciplines, has well-known mathematical properties, and has 
a deep connection to human cognitive processes. It has been used by political 
scientists to describe political party systems much like Professor Taagepera’s 
measure for effective number of parties. [See Kirchgaessner and zu Himmern (1997) 
for an example of the use of entropy to analyze German elections.]  Other 
mathematical measures might give similar results, but I have not investigated that.  
 
Given a set S of n alternative events or choices, with probability pi for i = 1, 2, . . .  
n, the entropy of the set is  
 
  H(S) = -  pi log(pi) 
 
Entropy is always positive and attains its maximum value log n when all events are 
equally probable. Usually the logarithm is to base 2 and the units are bits, a 
convention followed here. 
 
Among other possibilities, entropy can be used as a measure of dispersion of votes 
across the party system in parliamentary or American presidential elections. The 
entropy of the distribution of votes across political parties can be calculated from the 
portion of votes each party wins or, equivalently, from the probabilities that 
randomly chosen voters vote for each party. In a two-party system, entropy will be 
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greatest when the party vote shares are closest to equality and the election is most 
competitive. As one party becomes dominant, entropy decreases. In a multiparty 
system, entropy increases as the vote share shifts from the largest parties to minor 
parties, as when the party system becomes increasingly fragmented or new minor 
parties draw voters away from older parties. This may or may not represent a more 
competitive election. Entropy generally increases with the number of parties.  
 
Let H(P) be the party entropy calculated retrospectively from the fraction of the vote 
going to each party. For example, if the vote divides among three parties in the 
proportions 0.60, 0.30, 0.10 then  
 
 H(P) = -  pi  log pi  = - .6 log .6 - .3 log .3 - .1 log .1 = 1.29 bits 
 
In party entropy calculations here I used the number of parties as typically 
presented in election data by the sources that report the data. If the data included 
an “other” parties or “minor” parties category, I added that as another category in 
the entropy calculation. The number of parties is a fuzzy measure and I didn’t want 
to introduce my own bias as to what to count. If one is only speaking of parties in a 
legislature, then the number of parties may be well determined. But when people are 
voting, they may differ in their awareness of the competing parties; the number of 
parties depends on how most people categorize them perceptually. If people are not 
aware of a party, then it will have no bearing on their voting decisions. So, I would 
say that if people are not aware of some minor parties or lump them together 
conceptually, that is how they should be dealt with analytically when analyzing 
voting data. This is a problem that can be investigated empirically, of course. 
 
Qualitative predictions 
Cyclic Behavior. Cyclic behavior is common in systems of all types. Business cycles, 
for example, are frequently observed and are a topic of long-standing interest in 
economic theory. A similar question comes up in elections. Do fluctuations in the 
vote shares for parties follow a regular pattern? Is there a tendency for a two-party 




The relatively stable party systems in most established democracies suggest that 
voters are interested in stability. Suppose, as a hypothesis, that voters try to 
maintain a fairly stable equilibrium in their political party system, such that no one 
party completely dominates the others in all elections and that minor parties are not 
eliminated. If one party is getting too far ahead of the others in this scenario, some 
voters may react by voting for an opposition party. It is known that any system 
controlled by negative feedback will oscillate if there is a delay in the feedback loop. 
That is, if to maintain stability some people adjust their voting behavior in response 
to results of the last election or, perhaps, expected results of an upcoming election, 
and they are not aware that some other voters are doing the same thing, there likely 
will be an over-correction in voting. Continued voting decisions like this will produce 
cycles in the party system. This is one instance where theory may predict cyclic 
change.  
 
So how should one look for cyclic behavior in a party system? Suppose that we use 
the entropy measure or a similar mathematical measure that captures the overall 
distribution of party vote shares to assess cycles in voting. Typically one might think 
first of a time series analysis, but this can be difficult with small samples and it 
invites many statistical problems. Instead I suggest changing the coordinates to 
makes an easier, qualitative test of the theory.  
 
To study change one can use a special graphical technique also known as a Poincare 
phase space map. I plot political party entropy H(P) and its rate of change in each 
election successively on a graph and connect the points. The horizontal or x-axis 
represents the value of H(P) at an election; the vertical graph is the rate of change 
of H(P) at that election. Change in H(P) at a given election is the amount of change 
from the previous election, that is, the difference between the current value and the 
previous. Because we only have measurements of H(P) at elections, the graph is a 
series of points, not a smooth or continuous line, but we can connect the points with 
straight lines to show the path of change. If the data have a trend as well as a cycle, 
the trend should be removed before analysis. 
 
This type of graph is well suited to showing change that cycles, including cases 
where the system comes to an equilibrium and no further change occurs for a time. 
If change is cyclical, like the motion of a pendulum, the graph of change is 
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approximately an ellipse or circle with the system moving clockwise around the 
ellipse. See, for example, Figure 1. If the system comes to rest, like a pendulum 
gradually slowing to a stop, the graph will be a clockwise spiral in toward the 
equilibrium or resting point. As a system cycles around, one can easily compare one 
cycle with the next, as the path of the system overlays itself repeatedly on the 
graph.  
 
One must be cautious, however, in interpreting causality from an elliptical pattern. A 
sequence of random changes can also look cyclic or quasi-cyclic. For example, when 
counting ballots in a close election between two candidates, one candidate may be 
ahead for a time, but then the other candidate may take the lead, and then the first 
candidate again, and so on, with the lead switching from on to the other. (This 
pattern is known as the arc sine law.) One can try to distinguish between a random 
cycle and a causal cycle with statistical tests, though these may lack power if the 
sample is small. For example, if there is a correlation between consecutive points, 
this would cause one to reject randomness. One can also use a nonparametric runs 
test. To my knowledge, political science does not have a theory of random change in 
voting for political parties that would produce cyclic behavior in the party system. 
Economists, by contrast, have discussed this quite a lot in analyzing stock market 
prices.  
 
Now let’s apply this method to parliamentary elections in postwar France from 1946 
to 1988. Data are from Mackie and Rose (1991). Figure 2 shows first the 
conventional time series view, plotting party entropy against the year of the election. 
Figure 3 shows the data in the Poincare phase space coordinates. To my eye, Figure 
3 brings out the cyclic behavior much more clearly than Figure 2. Statistical tests, 
however, do not reject the possibility that this change is random, but the power of 
the test is small with a sample size of only 13 elections. (Or one might say that the 
results are inconclusive as to randomness.) I have found similar cyclic patterns in 
voting in a number of countries, though the rate and amplitude of the cycles varies 
across countries (Coleman 1993). 
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Figure 2. Party entropy change in postwar France (1946-1988)—time series.  
 
 
































































A good example of a political system cycling toward an approximate equilibrium is 
Japan in the 17 postwar elections from 1947 to 1990, as seen in Figure 4. The data 
for each election are national averages for the 46 prefectures (excluding Okinawa). 
(Japanese election data are published in annual volumes of the Japan Statistical 
Yearbook in English language.) The graph shows that the party system starts out 
with some noncyclic, jerky changes in the first few postwar elections, then makes a 
wide cycle of change closing in to smaller cycles after 1967; party entropy changes 
very little from 1972 to 1990, when the system is close to equilibrium. Statistical 
testing rejects randomness for this case. One cannot determine, however, if the 
equilibrium is stable. 
 
We can also examine dynamics and equilibrium in a different coordinate system, 
which some also call phase space analysis. We put H(P)n on the horizontal axis and 
H(P)n+1 on the vertical axis for election n and party entropy H(P).  
 
An equilibrium satisfies the condition that H(P)n+1 = H(P)n  which we can represent 
with the 45 degree line when we plot H(P)n+1 against H(P)n, as in Figure 5 for the 
same sequence of Japanese elections seen in Figure 4.  
 
These examples are designed to show how changes in the coordinate system can 
improve our understanding of a dynamic process. These alternate representation of 
reality are especially useful, I believe, when dealing with short time series—say, 
fewer than 20 points—or when comparing one country with another—typical 
applications in political science. In these situations, I suggest, the gross qualitative 
characteristics of the dynamic patterns are the important features. Little more would 
be added by reformulating the short time series quantitatively, as in a Fourier 
analysis or ARIMA model. The key features of the graphs might be further enhanced, 
however, with smoothing techniques.   
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Note: The 1972 election is not labeled and the 1986 election, also unlabeled, is at 
the same point as 1983. 
 
  



































1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5





















Harmonic distribution. Suppose that within a country people in each local 
geographical area are influenced in their attitudes or behavior by the people in 
immediately surrounding areas. More specifically, suppose that in any small area 
people’s behavior is approximately an average of the behaviors in surrounding small 
areas. If the neighboring community to the west is high on some measure, and the 
community to the east low, then the community in the middle has a mid-level 
ranking. Now what would this look like if we extrapolate this to a large geographic 
area, an entire country?  
 
The result is a spatial distribution with a unique mathematical form, the harmonic 
function. We are all very familiar with this in a different guise—the daily weather 
map that shows bands of equal temperature across a country or continent. Typically 
the coldest areas are to the north and temperature bands show gradual warming as 
one moves south. Other properties of harmonic functions are that the highest and 
lowest values will be on the border of the system, and the average around any circle 
will equal the value at the center.  
 
As a fairly good example of a harmonic distribution, Figure 6 shows political party 
entropy contours across states in the US presidential election of 1968, which was a 
three-party election (Coleman 1975). Party entropy changes smoothly as one moves 
along the eastern seaboard from the highest entropy state, South Carolina, to the 
lowest, Maine. All the entropy contours in units of a tenth bit are crossed. The 
distribution is not perfectly harmonic but is supportive of the underlying theoretical 
model of spatial influence in voting. It would be difficult to get this result with any 
quantitative statistical method. The graphical result can be supported, however, by a 
conventional statistical analysis of correlations between neighboring states.  
 
Although data analysts are well aware of serial correlations in time series data and 
how to deal with them, analysts seldom apply the same rigor to correlations in cross-
sectional analyses of within county data. This is admittedly a difficult problem and 
spatial analyses, themselves, are much more difficult than regression models. But 
this example shows how simple qualitative mapping techniques can give us some 
insight to when spatial correlations should be considered in our analyses.  
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Figure 6. A near harmonic entropy distribution in the party vote for presidential 





The next examples are from my research on the effects of social conformity on a 
variety of collective behavior patterns, including crime and voting, which look very 
much alike from this point of view. My concern is the sociological or, better, the 
social-psychological influences of conformity or group pressure on voting behavior 
and how this may look on a large scale. Because there may be many types of voting 
behavior—people make their voting choices for different reasons—one must figure 
out how to detect conformist behavior and, if possible, distinguish it from other types 
of decisions. Does conformist behavior have a unique signature that would allow us 
to say, “Yes, that’s conformist behavior and, No, it is almost certainly not rational 
decision making or any other type that we know about”? A predictive test like this 
fits the psychological model of how people develop causal theories.  
 
In most countries a large share of the electorate vote because of the social norm 
that good citizens should vote (Blais 2000, Knack 1992; Knack and Kropf 1998). This 
is an example of the effect of social conformity, which can be a response to a social 
norm or group pressure, or occur when people adapt their behavior to what most 
people are doing in a given situation. It is also known that, in the aggregate, when 
people respond to one type of social norm they are also more likely to respond to 
other norms. The more similar the norms, the more spillover of conformity from one 
norm to the next. Salience and priming also increase people’s conformity with a 
norm. That is, if we remind people to vote, those most responsive to conformist 
pressures will be induced to conform. At the individual level, however, people vary in 
their response to conformist pressures and situational effects are significant.  
 
I propose using voter turnout in a national election as a standard for measuring the 
conformity level in a country, at least for those people most responsive to 
conformity. It gives a snapshot of how successful a nation is at getting people to 
follow a widely accepted social norm. But turnout must be adjusted quantitatively to 
how people perceive it in terms of social conformity (Coleman 2004). Psychological 
research reveals that when people observe events with a probabilistic distribution 
their response is better described by the entropy measure. That is, there is a 
nonlinearity in how people react to perceived probabilities; a change in the 
probability of an unlikely event has more impact than a change of equal increment of 
probability change in a very common event.  
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So one can calculate a turnout entropy H(T) from turnout t as 
 
  H(T) = - t log t – (1-t) log (1-t) 
 
The theoretical relationship between voter turnout and perceived conformity, 
measured by entropy, is shown in Figure 7. Note that the least conformist situation is 
when the turnout is closest to 50%. This is where people would be most uncertain 
about whether the norm was to vote or not to vote. As turnout increases or 
decreases, those who are responsive to conformity will see a stronger norm toward 
voting or not voting. Note that this model assumes that for many people the act of 
voting involves only two choices, to vote or abstain.  
 
This curve is a signature of conformity. It has distinguishing characteristics: 
nonlinearity approximately in the shape of a parabola, symmetry about the midpoint, 
and the maximum at 50% turnout. These are qualitative and quantitative features 
that we can use as predictions for testing the theory that social conformity affects 
voting or other social behaviors on a large scale. 
 
We can predict from the properties of the entropy function (or Figure 7) that places 
with turnout closer to 50% also should exhibit lower social conformity on other types 
of social behavior that is typically moderated or controlled by social conformity 
(Coleman 2002, 2004). This is a quantitative prediction that one can test for, as well 
as the qualitative symmetrical relationship of conformity with respect to voter 
turnout above and below 50%. 
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Figure 7. The relationship between turnout, turnout entropy, and perceived 
conformity.
 


























Crime Rates and Conformity 
Let’s examine first the proposition that conformity affects crime rate. It is well known 
that crime is partially controlled by social pressures to obey laws and social norms 
(Coleman 2002). In Figure 8, I show how the rate of aggravated (serious) assaults 
varies in relation to turnout in American states. I used crime data for three years 
(1960, 1970, 1980) matched with three presidential elections (1960, 1972, 1980). I 
picked these years because there were several states with voter turnout below 50%, 
which makes for a better test of the signature shape. I transformed the crime rate 
with the log function to facilitate additional statistical testing (as is often done with 
crime analyses). To test for a maximum at the predicted 50% turnout and the 
symmetry about that line, I fit a parabolic equation to the data as a function of 
turnout and estimated the location of the parabolic maximum from the coefficients in 
the fitted parabolic curve (also shown in Figure 8). That is, I am using statistical 
regression analysis to test a specific theoretical prediction, not in a hunt for possible 
causes or explanatory variables. To establish a confidence interval for the estimated 
location of the parabolic maximum, I used a bootstrap method, resampling the data 
with replacement 1,000 times and re-estimating the model each time. For added 
confirmation of the findings I did multiple regression analyses with independent 
variables known to be related to crime.  
 
The net result is an estimated parabolic maximum in state aggravated assault rates 
at 46% turnout with a 95% bootstrap confidence interval (CI) of [36%, 51%]. The 
simple bivariate graphical analysis seen in Figure 8 holds up through the additional 
statistical control, and similar results are observed for other types of violent crimes 
and burglary (Coleman 2002). Although the maximum of the parabola is not exactly 
at 50% turnout, that point is within the confidence interval. I would also suggest that 
even if the parabolic maximum were not so close to 50%, these findings would still 
be strong confirmation of the theory based on the qualitative signature. There is no 
other good explanation that I can offer to explain the observed parabolic relationship 
between voter turnout and crime rate. Note also that the lack of causality makes this 
an interesting finding, as one does not expect that voting causes crime. Instead one 
must look toward a mutual explanation of both phenomena, such as conformity.  
 
To confirm the generality of these results, I have looked at a few other countries. 
Figure 9 shows the same analysis for German Laender in the western part of the 
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country. Because voter turnout in Germany, as in most European countries, has little 
within-country variation and is almost always over 50%, one sees only part of the 
parabolic curve—a part of the curve, in fact, that is more nearly linear than 
curvilinear. Serious assault rates in Germany fit the same pattern as in the US, 
though one does not see the parabolic effect in Germany. This is sharp reminder that 
one should be aware that the range of a variable may limit our testing of a theory 
and, if we are not careful, bias our results. (There are too few eastern Laender for 












Notes: For the bivariate plot, N = 144, R squared = 0.61, parabolic maximum is 
estimated at 47% turnout. 


































Notes: Crime data from Bundeskriminalamt, www.bak.de; N = 11; R squared = 
0.87; p < .0001.





















Spillover Effect. In earlier research (Coleman 2004) I showed that conformity in the 
decision to vote can spill over to affect voting choices for political parties. 
Psychological research informs us that people tend to be consistently conformist, and 
that if they are prompted to conform in one instance they are likely to conform in a 
different but related instance (Cialdini et al 1990; Knack 1992; Knack and Kropf 
1998). So the degree of conformity one sees in collective voter turnout should have 
a correlation with voting for political parties. Not all voters may be affected by this, 
but we can test for the strength or prevalence of conformity in voting choices.  
 
If a society is becoming less conformist, voters may shift to minor or new parties on 
the fringe while turnout shifts toward 50%. If a society is becoming more conformist, 
one might expect to see people shifting from minor parties to major parties, while 
turnout increases toward 100% or decreases toward 0. In extreme conformity one 
might see the suppression of minor parties and their adherents. Because party 
entropy is related to both the distribution of votes across parties and the number of 
parties, the prediction is that the number of parties likely increases as turnout shifts 
toward 50%. 
 
One can express this idea of conformity spilling over from turnout to party choices 
more strongly and quantitatively. A first hypothesis or model is that entropy of party 
voting H(P) is positively correlated with entropy of turnout H(T); such as,  
 
  H(P) = a H(T) + b 
 
Because the two entropy measures are on different ratio scales, each ranging from 0 
to log k for k choices, we can rewrite this as a stronger hypothesis that  
 
  H(P) = log k  H(T)  
 
In this model H(P) is predicted to be a multiple of H(T).  
 
One can test these models directly—and I give some examples below—but a change 
in coordinates brings us to a better test of the predicted qualitative signature and 
symmetry. More often one would test a model with H(P) as a function of turnout 
instead of H(T). As a function of turnout, H(P) is predicted to look like the nearly 
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parabolic curve in Figure 7 but multiplied by a factor of log k. I don’t know of any 
other voting theory that would make a similar prediction.l 
 
We can easily test this prediction by a conventional linear regression analysis, 
regressing party entropy H(P) on a parabolic (2nd degree polynomial) function of 
turnout t 
 
 H(P) = a0 + a1 t + a2 t2 
 
If the coefficients reach statistical significance, one can determine if the parabola has 
a maximum or minimum and then estimate its location with respect to turnout. (The 
extremum is at turnout = -a1/(2a2); a bootstrap estimate is used to find a confidence 
interval for the location, as with the crime analysis above.)  If the fit is closer to a 
straight line than a parabola, the analysis will reveal that as well. The parabolic 
regression also permits testing the predicted hypothesis against alternatives where 
the maximum of the curve is shifted away from 50% turnout, something not possible 
when regressing H(P) against H(T). 
 
Testing this hypothesis is essentially the same as the analysis of crime rates. One 
can look for a symmetrical distribution of party entropy H(P) centered near a turnout 
of 50%. This should be true in either longitudinal (time series) data and cross-
sectional data. To make a good test of this, I needed to find elections with a wide 
range of turnout, extending well below 50% to higher levels. Fortuitously, turnout 
did vary widely across American states in U.S. presidential elections in the early 
decades of the 20th century including states in the South with very low turnout.  
 
If one aggregates all American states and elections from 1920 to 1988, one finds a 
parabolic maximum at turnout = 56% with a 95% CI [54.6%,58.1%] (See Coleman 
2004 for more detail; women’s suffrage first covered all states in 1920.) There are 
too many data points to show this graphically, so as another example I averaged the 
turnout and party entropy over each state from 1920 to 1996 and fitted a parabolic 
curve, which has a maximum at 58.6% turnout (Figure 10); averaging, of course, 
increases the explained variation. To look at a single election, see Figure 11, the 
result for testing the prediction for the U.S. 1932 presidential election. In this case 
the maximum is shifted above 50% to about 65%. Does this departure from 50% 
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cause us to reject the hypothesis? I don’t think so; but it might cause us to look for 
additional factors that may have caused the results to vary from the prediction in 
specific elections. For example, a mix of conformity with other types of voting 
behavior might change the outcome. Figure 12 shows the results for 1968 when 
George Wallace ran as a strong third-party candidate, especially in the South. 
Turnout increased in the South nearer to 50%, and the highest values of party 
entropy also are near 50 percent turnout as seen in Figure 12. Compared with 1932, 
one sees here more of the right half of the parabolic-like distribution. 
 
See Coleman (2004) for more results and analysis for elections in the U.S., Western 
and Eastern Europe, and Russia. (For comprehensive results on Russia and Eastern 
Europe see also the ancillary material for Political Analysis Volume 12(1) (2004) on 
the Website of the Political Methodology Society, a section of the American Political 
Science Association, http://polmeth.wustl.edu/polanalysis/ancillary12.html.)  
 
Figures 13-19 illustrate the results for several European parliamentary elections. I 
picked examples that show strong evidence of the predicted conformity pattern in 
voting behavior, including Russia, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, as reported in 
Coleman (2004). In these cases one can easily see the qualitative aspects of the 
predicted model. Minimal statistical results are reported in notes to the figures, as 
the findings are already evident in the graphical presentations. Moderately strong 
conformity effects (not shown) are also found in Norway, Sweden, Spain, Romania, 
Ukraine, and Poland. Countries where the effect is weak include France and Britain, 
though Figure 19 is an exception, showing a moderate conformity effect on the 
British vote for the European Parliament. The analysis excluded countries with 
compulsory voting.   
 30 
Figure 10. U.S. presidential elections, 1920-96; mean party entropy H(P) of each 
state in relation to its mean turnout in elections from 1920 to 1996; shown with 
parabolic curve fitting (solid line) and entropy curve estimated at 1.19 H(T) (broken 
line). 
Notes: N = 48; parabolic fit R square = 0.72; maximum of parabola estimated at 
58.6% turnout; women’s suffrage began in 1920. 
  



























Figure 11. U.S., 1932, parabolic relationship between turnout and political party 
entropy H(P) for the 48 states. 
 
 
Notes: Estimated parabolic maximum is at 65% turnout with 95% bootstrap CI = 
[59,75]; R square = 0.79; p < .0001. 
  





















Figure 12. Party entropy H(P) and turnout in US 1968 presidential with a strong 
third party; theoretical maximum party entropy for three parties is 1.58 at 50 
percent turnout; data shown with linear fit. 
Note: N = 48; R square = .45; p< .0001. 























Figure 13.  Turnout and party entropy in the Russian parliamentary election of 
1993; district level analysis with parabolic curve fitting (solid line) and entropy curve 
(broken line) estimated by regressing on turnout entropy as in Figure 7.                                               
 
Notes: N = 84, one outlier removed; R square = 0.40; parabolic maximum estimated 
at 49.5% turnout with bootstrap 95% CI = [36.6, 51.9]; H(P) = 3.3 H(T).
























Figure 14. Germany, 1903-87, turnout and political party entropy H(P); data fitted 
with parabolic curve (solid line) and entropy curve (broken line) estimated by 
regressing on turnout entropy curve give almost identical results. 
 
Notes: N = 23; R squared for linear fit is 0.70. Correlation of number of parties with 
turnout is -0.68 (p = .0003). 




















Figure 15. Germany, 1903-87, time series representation of turnout entropy H(T) 
and political party entropy H(P) show same proportional change in each measure.  
 
Notes: N = 23; party entropy H(P) divided by 4 (= log 16) to align with H(T) based 
























































Figure 16. Germany, 1903-87, linear regression of H(P) against H(T) also shows 
proportional change in each measure. 
 
  






















Figure 17. Austria, Germany and Switzerland: combined parliamentary elections 
from 1946 to 1987; relationship between party entropy and turnout. 
 
  



























Figure 18. Austria, Germany, and Switzerland: combined elections from 1946 to 
1987, relationship between party entropy and turnout with parabolic curve fitting. 
 
 
Notes: N = 34. For parabolic fit R square = 0.87 and the parabolic maximum is 
estimated to be at 51% turnout. 






















Figure 19. U.K. election to the European Parliament, 1994, turnout and political 
party entropy H(P) with linear fit—a rare European election with turnout below 50 
percent in all constituencies shows only one side of the expected parabolic 
relationship. 
 
Notes: N = 83; R squared = 0.35; p < .0001.





















Constraints. As a final example I show how one might examine constraints and 
extremes in voting behavior. Psychological research shows that people have a 
definite limit on their capacity to process probabilistic information about categories 
along a single dimension (Miller 1956). This also seems to apply to group decision 
making, as when people are using and sharing the same probabilistic information 
(Miller and Bieri 1963). On the entropy scale this is about 3 bits, which corresponds 
to a person trying to accurately discriminate among 8 alternative choices or events if 
they are equally likely to be observed. A person can keep track of more choices if 
some are less probable than others. Near the psychological limit, people make more 
errors in categorization.  
 
Researchers have also explored how consumers make choices and, as with the 
entropy studies, report inherent cognitive limits. Iyengar and Lepper (1999) showed 
this experimentally by offering consumers either six choices of jams or two dozen 
choices. When offered the higher number, consumers were much less likely to buy 
any; they preferred having the smaller number of choices. This experiment echoes 
research by Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990) showing that when consumers are faced 
with more options and more information about them, they tend to consider fewer 
choices and use less of the available information.  
 
Assume that people are using and sharing probability information about political 
parties—the likelihood of other voters voting for each party or, equivalently, the 
percentage of votes likely to go to each party—when they decide how they will vote. 
Then one might expect to see a constraint on their collective behavior when 
measuring the political party entropy. One might also expect that voters will not 
tolerate too great a number of parties. To test these ideas, I examined the number 
of parties and party entropy H(P) for parliamentary elections in Germany and France 
from the late 1800s. Figure 20 shows the theoretical maximum party entropy in 
relation to the number of parties and the observed entropy in Germany. Note that 
the observed values increase with the number of parties competing but then level 
out and apparently decrease at the highest number of parties. The same holds for 
France (Figure 21). This pattern is similar to the behavior of consumers who have 
too many choices. 
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We can supplement the graphical analysis with statistical analysis. For this period in 
Germany there were 33 parliamentary elections. Party entropy ranged from 1.7 to 
3.3 bits. Assuming that this is a representative sample of possible German elections 
extending forward in time, one can estimate that in 1/(n+1) = 1/34 = 3% of 
possible elections party entropy will exceed the observed maximum of 3.3 or fall 
below 1.7. (See Lindgren 1962:275 for the derivation, which is independent of the 
population distribution.) One can interpret these estimates as a measure of the 
extremes of German voting behavior and, in particular, an estimate of the upper 
limit, which is related to cognitive functioning. One can also estimate that sometime 
in the next hundred years or so the German party system is likely to return to a 
degree of fragmentation not seen since the Weimar era. This is a simple example of 
how one might examine the likelihood of extreme events in a political party system, 




Figure 20. Germany, 1871-1987, party entropy in relation to number of parties with 
parabolic curve fitting. 
 
Notes: N = 33; R squared = 0.82; parabolic maximum estimated at 17 parties. 






















Figure 21. France, 1876-1978, party entropy in relation to number of parties; 
parabolic curve fit. 
 
Notes: N = 30; R squared = 0.93; parabolic maximum estimated at 11 parties.






















Reviews of past statistical research warn us to be careful about drawing theoretical 
inferences from observational data. Even a meticulous use of regression analysis that 
meets all the preconditions can lead one far astray. In this paper I have tried to give 
some concrete examples of how one can make interesting, definitive, and testable 
predictions in the area of voting behavior. Such predictions do not free us from 
statistical analysis but may lessen the risk of false positive results, at the same time 
leading to better theory construction.  
 
I suspect that the primary critique of the examples I’ve presented here is that they 
are peripheral to concerns of many political scientists. What about predicting which 
party will win an election, isn’t that a concern? Or political attitudes? Or the future of 
democracy? And so on, to any of the hundreds of topics one hears at a political 
science conference. I agree with that assessment.  
 
The problem, as I see it, is that political science does not have a clear line between 
an identifiable core science of the discipline and politics. What is missing is the 
distinction that, by analogy, on finds between physics and engineering, economics 
and business, psychological science and psychological therapy, or physiology and 
medicine. True, a distinction is made between political science and public 
administration or, perhaps, public policy, among some academic communities. But 
political science tries to encompass a range of phenomena and concerns that go far 
beyond what any scientific theory will ever explain. This leads to over-expectations 
for a science of politics and frustration when the methods we use do not produce the 
hoped for results. Often one can and should apply scientific methods to an applied 
problem, but that does not make it a scientific concern. I believe we will be more 
productive as scientists if political science more carefully defines its scope as a 
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